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The Postmodern Spirit and the Status of God 
In this essay, I propose to consider the status of the 
concept of God in light of the postmodern spirit. After 
characterizing the nature of this postmodern spirit, I will 
identify three options regarding the idea of God, arguing for the 
superiority of one of these. 
I. The Postmodern Spirit 
In my article, "Discerning the Spirits of Modernity and 
Postmodernity", I have claimed that the "controlling picture" or 
basic assumption of postmodernity is that a person is always 
standing in the world, with at least "one foot in" one's body, 
temporality, language, society, culture, history, tradition, etc. 
This contrasts with modernity's controlling assumption that the 
individual can leave behind all limitations of one's body and 
perceptual equipment, temporality, language, and culture and reach 
an absolutely privileged position where one can "see" everything, 
including oneself, with total clarity. 
Some ramifications of this postmodern spirit are: 
1) Epistemologically someone knowing or perceiving something 
is the only starting point. Neither mind/subject or body/object 
is an absolute or privileged starting point. The attempt to reach 
a subject in itself (in total distinctness from any object known) 
or an object in f (in total distinctioness from any subject 
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knowing it) is misguided in principle. There is no direct or 
immediate knowing of a subject in itself nor or an object in 
itself. And there is no pure or absolute subject to be abstracted 
out of the world and society in which one is embodied. 
2) Our knowing plays a constitutive part in what we know. 
Knowing or perceiving, which involves desiring and acting, playa 
significant role in creating the world we experience. As 
Cezanne's out of focus paintings suggest (these can be regarded as 
artistic harbingers of a postmodern age), reality is fuzzy or 
indefinite apart from our participation which brings it into 
definition (Poteat: 59). 
3) Absolute schemas are suspect, whether binary oppositions 
such as subject/object, mind/body, sense/reason, or human/natural 
worlds or postulations of the essence of being, human nature, 
history, religion, or a text. Such absolutistic or rigid schemes 
of categorization miss the richness, complexity, interrelatedness, 
and contextuality of life, especially in its temporal and changing 
character and in its prereflective and tacit dimensions. 
For our purposes, we can note three important entailments of 
the postmodern spirit: A) Human knowledge is always mediated, 
constructed, or contextual (at least in part). B) Creatures are 
interconnected with one another and with the world. Persons are 
not simply or absolutely distinct from one another and the 
environment; we are also a part of one another and the 
environment. Where self ends and other begins is not clear-cut 
but relative to context. C) The body is crucial in all our 
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knowing and relating. Here body is understood not as something 
split from mind nor simply physical, but as correlative with 
consciousness. A person is rather a mindbodily continuum. 
"Mind", as being aware of and attempting to make sense of things, 
and "body", as that with which we have and relate to a world are 
not simply distinguishable but are radically interrelated, and 
both come into play at some level in all our acts. 
II. The Three Types 
I find in contemporary theology and philosophy of religion 
three types of response sympathetic to the postmodern spirit 
regarding the viability of the concept of God. In brief these 
responses are: 1) minimalist conceptions of God; 2) denial of the 
concept of God, the "death of God"; 3) fairly traditional 
conceptions of God. 
Given the wariness of the postmodern spirit about grand 
claims to knowledge, is not surprising that some philosophers 
of religion and theologians are offering minimalist conceptions of 
"God." One such thinker, a senior statesman on the theological 
scene, Gordon Kaufman, has moved from more traditional 
understandings of God. In his latest work, In Face of Mystery, 
Kaufman identifies God with "serendipitous creativity" 
(especially, 264-80). Kaufman opts against attributing to God 
personality, 	consciousness in any sense, intentionality, or agency 
(268-72, 329). This is in contrast to earlier work that 
characterizes divine creativity in terms of an overarching "act" 
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(Kaufman, 1968:50-56). Kaufman even expresses an unwillingness to 
assign any actual transcendence to God, finding it sufficient to 
identify God with, or as wholly within, the cosmic process (1993: 
271-72)1. There are, however, some countervailing tendenc 
where some transcendence seems to come in through the back door, 
as when Kaufman speaks of God as "ground [ing] " (296), "underlying" 
(330), "behind" (297, 418), "unifying" (418), "expressing itself" 
(296, 417), or "working" (297, 330, 339, 415) in and through 
processes, all reality. In this minimalist project Kaufman hopes 
to reconstruct the concept of God so that both theists and 
nontheists who find the universe conducive to life and its 
fillment can find common ground as to an ultimate concept. 
In a similar vein to Kaufman, Sallie MCFague dec in 
Models of God that all Christianity claims "with any assurance" 
about ultimate reality is that it is supportive of life and its 
fillment, and she parenthetically adds--claiming more than 
Kaufman- that this power is "personal" (x). Anything beyond that 
reveals something about how human beings should or do understand 
themselves, their society, and their world, but does not reveal 
anything more about God. 
I should note that such minimalist conceptions of God are not 
new with the current scene. For example, in the 1940's Henry 
Nelson Wiemann developed a process perspective that identified God 
with the growth of value in the universe. Similarly, John Dewey 
10fficially transcendence is either unknowable (the ultimate mystery [415]) or 
merely formal ("the (imagined) ultimate point of reference" [327]). 
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identified God as the process of human beings interacting with the 
larger environment, ever creating new values. In "Discerning the 
Spirits of Modernity and Postmodernity," I have claimed that the 
shift from a modern to a postmodern age has been a gradual and 
ongoing one that began in the nineteenth century. If this is the 
case, it is not surprising that minimalist ideas of God are not 
brand new. Interestingly, what is perhaps new is that such ideas 
are now being advanced by thinkers in their capacities as mainline 
Christian theologians rather than by thinkers, albeit influenced 
by the Christian tradition, writing solely or mainly as 
philosophers of religion. 
The above kinds of minimalist conceptions of God are 
attractive in avoiding both modern absolutism and relativism (the 
latter following from the failure to realize absolute knowledge 
and presence). They also are conducive to the postmodern concern 
to respect "otherness", in granting that other religious--and 
secular--traditions are compatible with the most basic Christian 
or metaphysical claims. These conceptions do retain something of 
the basic western notion of God; though, the cruc question is 
whether they retain enough of that meaning to be judged a 
development of rather than an alternative to the concept of God. 
Minimalists can point to the negative theological tradition and to 
a traditional idea that we can only know God in relation to us, 
but not in God's self. On the other hand, thinkers of the via 
negativa, in affirming the divine infinity, unity, and 
transcendence have claimed much more than the minimalists. 
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Parenthetically, I do wonder if Sallie McFague would spend so much 
time developing symbols for God if she truly believed these told 
us nothing about the nature of ultimate reality but were only 
socially useful. 
More traditional conceptions of God provide an explanation of 
the universe--regarding it as caused by a conscious, intentional, 
and integrated reality--while minimalist conceptions attempt to be 
only or mainly descriptive of the universe. For those who feel 
the universe is amenable to an ultimate explanation, minimalist 
ideas will obviously be inadequate. 
I believe it is an uncontroversial claim that the large 
majority of contemporary theistic believers would find 
minimalistic ideas not to correspond sufficiently to what they 
mean by "God." However, the question of whether most future 
believers in the Christian and Western traditions will understand 
"God" in terms of "minimalist" conceptions is still to be decided 
--and minimalist thinkers are arguing that in light of the 
postmodern spirit this is the direction in which the concept of 
"God" should be modified. Later I will argue my position that the 
concept of God does not need to be changed so radically to be 
viable for an emergent postmodern age. 
I have indicated that minimalist ideas respect otherness in 
granting the truthfulness of basic claims of other religions and 
world views. However, the compatible truthfulness that is granted 
of a generalized and demythologized sort. More particular and 
traditional claims of other religions are not acknowledged by the 
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least common denominator approach of minimalism--even as most of 
the particular or traditional claims of Christianity are 
jettisoned. Differences among other religions are not 
suff iently respected, even as Christianity's own particular 
otherness--how it is different from other religions -is not 
sufficiently respected. My sense is that genuine dialogue is 
short circuited in a leap to a least common denominator. 
The second response holds that the absence of any absolute 
possession of truth or of the self by humans entails the absence 
of any absolute reality. On the plane of logic, this "death of 
God" or radical position is in error. Granting the contextual 
relativity of all human existence and meaning does not rule out 
the possibility of an absolute being or reality. The absence of 
any absolute human connection to the Absolute does follow from a 
consistent upholding of the contextual and mediated quality of all 
human knowing; but whether an absolute reality exists and can be 
known--relatively, of course--is not all settled by the 
acknowledgment of radical human contextuality. 
In fairness to radical thinkers, they do not explicitly claim 
logical entailment of the denial of absolute human meaning with 
the death of God. Rather the death of God is more an outgrowth of 
the spirit of this age. Assumed here is that God is basically a 
projection of human desires and values. Then as notions of human 
absoluteness gradually fade, so eventually fades away the 
affirmation of God. 
Radical postmodern thinkers include Mark C. Taylor in the 
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Protestant tradition and D.G. Leahy in the Catholic tradition. 
Reacting radically against modernity's picture of absolute 
transcendence, such thinkers take postmodern insight to entail the 
total immanence of a person in one's experiences: we are immersed 
in our perceptions, our words, our interpretations, our 
representations, our constructions of reality--and there is 
nothing more, at least that is knowable. 
While "God" is dead, these radical thinkers do not 
necessarily eschew some notion of divinity. Even as the person is 
wholly immanent in one's body and experiences, so divinity may be 
wholly immanent with respect to the world--even more so than in 
any traditional pantheism. Taylor writes of "the ever-never­
changing-same [that] is the eternally recurring play of the divine 
milieu in which all things [emphasis his] arise and pass away" 
(1984: 112-20, 183). Leahy exalts, "As never before the divine 
flows absolutely. In this flow every notion of self is completely 
dissolved" (786). Such immanentalism which affirms the 
interconnected totality of all that has or will transpire is in 
tension with an attitude of ironic relativism toward the various 
interpretations or constructions of reality in which individuals 
are immanent (an attitude that tends toward nihilism). It appears 
that radical immanentalism can avoid the standing nowhere of 
nihilism only by trying to stand everywhere. In works after 
Erring, by the way, Mark C. Taylor backs off from a divine 
immanentalism, sensing the totalizing tendencies of its backdoor 
retrieval of immediacy and full presence (e.g., 1991: 1-34). 
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We come now to the third type, those acknowledging the 
postmodern spirit, but retaining a fairly traditional idea of 
God2 : 
In varieties of Postmodern Theology, David Griffin recommends 
process theology's conception of God as especially appropriate to 
the postmodern spirit. It is certainly the case that the 
temporality and the interconnectedness, correlativity, and 
sociality of life that the postmodern spirit firms find in 
process thought counterparts in the nature of God: God has a 
genuinely temporal dimension in relating to the world and God 
affected by the creatures who are in some sense a part of God. On 
the other hand, in two ways process theology seems more modern 
than postermodern: 1) Its theories that gll reality consists of 
"occasions of experience" and that gll causation, including divine 
agency with respect to the world, consists of the prehension of 
past occasions of experience by present ones smack of modern 
2r will here mention those known as postliberal thinkers. Though coming from 
the conservative side, they share with the radical postmodernists an emphasis 
on human immanence in particular "cultural-linguistic" frameworks (Lindbeck). 
However, after affirming the postmodern spirit and both the self­
authenticating and apparently somewhat relativizing contextuality of 
Christianity and other world views, postliberals go on to claim for 
Christianity alone an absolute connection with God, an exclusive revelation 
from an extra cultural-linguistic reality. Thus a traditional, particularist 
vision of God emphasizing divine freedom and transcendence is affirmed, where 
God chooses to reveal God's self in a particular tradition in lieu of a more 
universal immanence (while human freedom and transcendence are downplayed or 
denied). Often postliberals explicitly eschew the tasks of philosophy of 
religion, natural theology, or apologetic theology. However, in appealing to 
postmodern logic, postliberals are implicitly offering an epistemological 
defense of their right to hold a very traditional idea of God, though, as r 
have argued, not consistently or effectively. 
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ideal reductionism. 2) Despite its emphasis on sociality, its 
theory of causality is ironically individualistic, indeed 
atomistic. God affects only individual occasions of experience, 
through their prehension of God as an attractive object (albeit 
God does attempt to influence the myriad creatures to make 
decisions conducive to an integrated world) . 
Various thinkers have offered conceptions of God that are 
traditional in affirming divine creativity, supreme power, 
omniscience and transcendence in the sense of some distinctness 
with respect to the world, while like process thought also 
upholding divine temporality and responsiveness/reciprocality with 
respect to the world.3 I would want to push this tendency by 
developing and promoting an explicit and full-fledged 
panentheistic understanding of God, which I will argue is very 
apropos vis-a-vis the postmodern spirit. 
III. The Inevitability of Metaphysics 
Preliminary to that, however, there are some metaphysical and 
epistemological issues to consider. Some will presume that, given 
the limitations on human knowing recognized by the postmodern 
spirit, either the minimal or radical perspective is credible, 
while more traditional conceptions of deity can no longer be 
plausibly defended. I will argue otherwise. 
3E.g., Nicolai Berdyaev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. John MacQuarrie, Hans 
Jonas, Matthew Fox. 
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To lead into these considerations, I will offer an 
observation relative to our preceding discussion. All three types 
share an emphasis on immanence in comparison to the relative 
emphasis on transcendence of classical theist models. The 
radicals do away with all transcendence, the minimalists allow 
just a hint of it, whi "traditionalists" affirm a substantial 
measure of transcendence. On one level, minimalists and radicals 
may evidence cognitive humility; however, to deny transcendence 
and make the ultimate more or less equivalent to the (processes 
of) the universe is in fact a definitive stand that claims much. 
While any transcendent aspect of the ultimate may be more 
difficult to know compared to an immanent aspect more immediately 
connected to observation of the universe, to more or less deny the 
reality of a transcendent dimension is hardly humble. A more 
"humble" position would be to say we can neither affirm nor deny 
anything regarding divine transcendence; nor can we say much, if 
anything, about immanent ultimacy or deity nor about the purposes 
and integrity of the universe, in as much as we are ignorant of 
the relationship, if any, of divine immanence to transcendence. 
The above hints that the eschewal of metaphysics by radicals 
and some other thinkers is not humble--nor successful. Far from 
being impossible since Kant's critique, metaphysics, while 
problematic, is inevitable. Every position or worldview involves 
beliefs and assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality and 
the nature of ultimate reality. To say that metaphysics is 
impossible itself claims something significant about the nature of 
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our universe--namely that the universe is so constituted that the 
ultimate nature of things is unknowable. 
Deconstructionists are rather specific in their "knowing" 
claims about the unknowability of things, claims that are not 
merely epistemological, but metaphysical; e.g. 1) no cognitive 
closure is possible; 2) there is no "reality", all is 
interpretation, representation. 4 
The postmodern perspective holds that meaning is contextual, 
temporal, and to a great extent, tacit; a corollary of this in 
that when we attempt to represent, reflect upon, or make explicit 
an experience, there is no absolute "translation"; rather there is 
always some distancing or gap between referrent and signifier. 
Derrida refers to the phenomena that representations never 
absolutely capture "reality" by the rubric differance. In 
Derrida's thought differance seems (almost?) reified and, in any 
case, functions like an overarching metaphysical category that 
includes the judgment that meaning is very unstable. 
Some who are more traditional, like Marion and Kaspar, try to 
sidestep metaphysics by speaking of God in terms of "love" and 
"freedom", rather than of "being". Whatever the value of this 
move may be, they are still maintaining an infinite and ultimate 
reality, necessary and absolute in some sense, that is the creator 
4For the postmodern spirit, in light of the inexhaustibility and temporality 
of life and creaturely fallibility, there is no absolute closure. Yet most 
creatures achieve adeguate cognitive closure and determinacy most of the time, 
according to a moderate postmodern perspective. 
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of the world. Clearly there are definite metaphysical commitments 
here, too, even if some of the terminology is more "biblical" than 
"philosophical". What is impossible and wrongheaded is the 
enlightenment absolutism that assumed we can establish neutral, 
universal metaphysical beliefs that all "reasonable" people will 
subscribe to. Given the plurality of metaphysical perspectives, 
radical postmodernists, "postliberals", and some others endorse 
incommensurability. The notion of the ultimate incommensurability 
of world views itself involves a metaphysical commitment. 
(In) commensurability must be argued. (It is not within the scope 
of this project to argue directly on this issue.) To conclude 
this section, those who take atheistic, agnostic, or minimalist 
positions regarding (ultimate) reality should not have their 
(often unclaimed) metaphysical commitments automatically granted a 
privileged status. 
IV. The (Un)Knowability of God 
Having argued for the inevitability of metaphysical 
commitments, I will now consider the issue of the (un)knowability 
of other beings, which may have some relevance to the question of 
the (un)knowability of God. One aspect of radical postmodernism 
is its positing of our immersion in our constructions, 
interpretations, representations of reality. In tension with this 
immanentalism with respect to meaning is radical postmodernism's 
emphasis on the indeterminancy, shiftiness, self-deconstructing or 
self oppositional nature of meaning: the "otherness", even if 
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unacknowledged, of all meaning I including the otherness within the 
self. (Perhaps what ties together these two tensive aspects is a 
lack of transcendence or freedom with respect to meaning: we are 
immersed in a constantly shifting interplay of the presence and 
absence of meaning.) If deconstructionism played only its 
immanentalist card, radical postmodernism would parallel the 
solipsistic tendencies of modernity. If the referentiality of 
perception and language becomes intractably problematic or 
impossible, then the very possibility of knowledge about entities 
somewhat external to us--not only God, but other human beings (and 
even reflective self-knowledge) -becomes doubtful or impossible. S 
Deconstructionism's "otherness" card f involves a tension. 
On the one hand I one could affirm the possibility of knowing, 
experiencing, or communing with the "other". This involves 
alterity becoming less other, becoming a part of oneself to some 
extent. On the other hand, one could emphasize the irreducible 
alterity or "strangeness" of the other. This has been the 
tendency of Mark C. Taylor (1987). Combining immanentalism with 
irreducible alterity might lead to a solipsistic conclusion. 
However, in practice, radical postmodernism has not denied our 
knowing other human beings. Rather, it has held only that much 
about other persons must remain "other" to us. While agreeing 
with the substance of this conclusion, I demur from the tone of 
5John caputo has recently argued that Derrida's emphasis on aterity gainsays 
interpretations of Derrida that entail our entrapment in language (or better, 
all our constructions of meaning). While I have noted the tension here, 
believe this tension is clearly present in the work of Derrida and other 
deconstructionists (e.g., Derrida, 298). 
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"strangeness", and note that there is much we can know about other 
human beings. If the postmodern insight that perception, 
symbolism, and language are never purely, transparently, or simply 
representational does not preclude knowledge of other beings, then 
one cannot preclude knowledge of God based solely on that insight. 
Instead, one must make a speci argument why God is uniquely 
unknowable, why the one sometimes called the wholly other must 
remain the (perhaps nonexistent) epistemologically wholly other. 
God, of course, has been understood traditionally as an 
ontologically and epistemologically exceptional case--without 
denying that some knowledge of God is possible. Some thinkers 
have made a sharp distinction between God in relation to us 
(somewhat knowable) versus God in God's own self (unknowable). 
John Hick with his Kantian contrast between the phenomenal and 
noumenal with respect to God (42ff, 83-87, 71-92) and Robert 
Neville with his distinction between God as expressed in creation 
and God as "utterly indeterminate" (8) are contemporary examples. 
Martin Heidegger has probably been the most influential 
contemporary thinker to use such a distinction, in this case that 
between Being and particular beings. Heidegger's distinction 
entails a "differentiating process which simultaneously connects 
them and holds them apart" (Godzieba). Traditional theology, on 
Heidegger's critique, has identified God with Being, while 
understanding Being as analogous to beings; thus God has been 
(incorrectly) put within the grip of the differentiating process 
(70-72). If God is instead understood as prior to the 
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differentiating process, then our only hope for knowing God is a 
glancing revelation. Regarding such revelation as impossible, 
many interpret the upshot of Heidegger's critique to be the 
impossibility of knowing God (Godzieba). 
I am not ready to accept a too sharp distinction between a 
transcendent (God in God's self) and an immanent (God for us) 
aspect of the divine. Such dualism is more in keeping with the 
modern than the postmodern spirit, seemingly an extension of 
subject-object dualism. The controlling picture of modernity 
created the problem of knowing other minds by its privileging of 
f exive subjectivity. However, in normal experience, from 
infancy on, we learn about self and others correlatively through 
our and their embodiment. (There is no reason to privilege our 
own subjectivity and intentionality, while doubting that of 
others.) 
My thesis is that we likewise know God through our--and 
God's embodiment in the world. If we grant the dualism between 
God in ation to world and in God's own self, we have already 
lost the epistemological ball game to the agnostic and atheistic 
interpreters of Heidegger. For if God in relation to the world­
divine immanence--cannot disclose anything about God's self or 
nature, that is, at least something of the value and purpose of 
creation for God, then indeed we have no right to postulate 
anything transcending the processes of the cosmos. But if we 
allow the possibility of some continuity or connection between God 
in relation to world and God's self and intentionality, knowledge 
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about the world (divine immanence) may yield some knowledge of the 
divine self or nature as more than world. Granted there is a 
distinction between the subjectivity-objectivity correlation in 
the world on the one hand and that which is prior to creaturely 
subjectivity-objectivity on the other. Yet I see no justification 
to a priori preclude knowing something about the initiator of the 
"differentiating process of being" by means of those processes of 
being. Panentheism, in particular (which shortly will be more 
fully expounded), offers a model where God is partially 
differentiated or distinguished from creation, but is not subject 
to the differentiating process in the way the creatures are, for 
God initiates, controls, and encompasses that process; thus, God 
is both immanent in and transcendent of that process. Because God 
is prior to that process, it can be part of God and God can be 
part of it. 
Some radical postmodernists, such as Charles Winquist, have 
made a more particular disclaimer of the possibility of knowledge 
of God. They have maintained that theological claims are wholly 
within a culture and language, and so cannot hope to refer to any 
transcendent reality. This seems to me a rather weak argument. 
Language and culture are continually changing, yet we are quite 
capable of partially transcending a given version of these in 
understanding new versions. Moreover, I submit we can have some 
understanding of other cultures and religions (albeit we do not 
understand these exactly as natives do). Furthermore, I submit 
that we can have some understanding of meaning for animals who are 
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not part of any human language or culture (albe our culture has 
some effect on our interpretation of these meanings). If we can 
partially transcend our cultural-linguistic frameworks to know 
something of these various others, there is no a priori reason to 
deny we may do so with respect to ultimate reality. 
I have attempted to refute epistemological and metaphysical 
arguments and question-begging assumptions against the possibility 
of metaphysics generally and, in particular, a more than 
minimalist theistic metaphysics. Hopefully having succeeded in 
clearing the decks for those who would develop modified 
traditionalist understandings of God, here is my attempt. 
V. A Panentheistic Concept 
Panentheism literally means "all [is] in God". The world and 
its creatures are part of God. There is an intimate connection, 
an immediacy of presence, of God to all that exists that surpasses 
the closeness of any creature to any other creature and even to 
itself. God knows all that exists without externality, mediation, 
or loss (though God's knowledge and valuation are more than the 
creaturely experiences that are wholly included in the divine 
experience). God also empowers all that exists without 
externality or mediation (save for the "externality" of some 
genuine indeterminacy and freedom of choice and action which God 
empowers in the creaturely realm) . 
God directly knows all that happens, all the joys and 
sorrows, the goods and ills of the world, and the divine beatitude 
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is therefore affected by what happens. God directly empowers what 
happens in the world, including some indeterminate freedom; 
therefore God is both active and passive or receptive in relation 
to creation. The metaphor of the world as God's body is an 
appropriate one for panentheism, for a creature has a 
(comparatively) direct awareness of much of what happens to its 
body and a (comparatively) direct control of much of the actions 
of its body. I grant it is controversial as to whether an 
immediacy or directness of divine power can be construed in such a 
way as to safeguard genuine creaturely indeterminate freedom. 
Elsewhere I have argued this compatibility (forthcoming; 1993), 
though such an argument is not within the purview of this project. 
Even as panentheism resists the tendencies of traditional 
theism to simply distinguish God from the creation, so it resists 
the tendency of pantheism to reduce God to the world--to its 
creatures, its structure, or the universe as a whole. In the 
postmodern vision of the human being, the person is neither simply 
nor absolutely distinguished from the body, the environment, and 
other creatures; neither is the person simply equated with, or 
undifferentially part of, the body, the environment, or other 
creatures. In its refusal to simply distinguish God from, or 
simply equate God with, the world and in its affirmation of God's 
embodiment in the world, panentheism offers a vision of God 
compatible with the postmodern vision of human beings and, I 
believe, compatible with the nature of reality and ultimate 
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reality. 6 
While I am not alone among contemporary thinkers in advancing 
a panentheistic view of God, my approach differs from two other 
types: 1) for some, such as Sallie McFague, their development of 
panentheism is, relatively speaking, on a metaphorical level, 
while my development of it is relatively more conceptual; 2) I 
offer a fuller version of panentheism than does process thought, 
in which God is panentheistic only as passive, not as active. 7 
VI. A Postmodern Epistemology: The Embodiment of God 
I have argued against the a priori, carte blanche 
unknowability of God (as well as offered a panentheistic 
conception of God that I believe will prove to be 
epistemologically defensible). There are, however, certain 
traditional sources for knowledge of God that must be discounted 
by the postmodern spirit. For if we apply the denial of absolute, 
direct, unmediated knowledge to our knowing of God, then we must 
deny the validity of the following: 1) revelation in the sense of 
a supernatural, self-authenticating action of or communication 
from God, 2) mystical experience as a direct awareness of the very 
consciousness or essence of God. 
6Interestingly, Kaufman decries "the idea of God as essentially an autonomous 
ego--utterly distinct from and independent of all other agents" (332), yet 
does not indicate why a panentheistic or other nonrninimalist organic 
conception of God cannot adequately address this and other shortcomings of the 
traditional model. 
71 have argued this point at some length in a paper entitled, "A Full-Fledged 
Panentheism: An Idea Whose Time Has Corne?" (1993), and in my forthcoming 
book, Panentheism in Hartshorne and Tillich. 
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The modern spirit has led many to deny tangible supernatural 
activity in the physical world. The notion of some direct divine 
presence or communication to human interiority, though, has been 
somewhat less suspect. However, if the logic of the postmodern 
spirit is played out, this notion, too, must fall. Some thinkers 
in the tradition of Barthian neo-orthodoxy, including the 
postliberals, have attempted to distance themselves from 
supernaturalism, while still maintaining--if not explaining--the 
absolute, self-authenticating character of divine revelatory 
activity. This too must' fail according to the postmodern spirit. 
While mystical experience may have some validity as a mode of 
consciousness that attunes one to the truth of the 
interconnectedness of all reality, postmodernly it cannot be 
understood as directly induced by God nor as a tapping into the 
very mind or consciousness of God. By way of contrast, much 
influential modern theology, affected by Romanticism and/or 
idealism, has included some version of a direct or mystical 
awareness of God: Tillich's "mystical a priori", neo-Thomism's 
implicit awareness and love for God, and Whitehead's "init 
aim" . 
If in the postmodern spirit we rule out any absolute or 
unmediated human connection with God, then I submit that how we 
know God should not differ in principle from how we know other 
realities. As I have indicated, for the postmodern spir 
knowing is bodily knowing. Here body not discontinuous with 
mind. Some knowing is relatively reflective; other knowing 
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more pre-reflective. All our knowing, however, is through our and 
others' embodiment in the world. Therefore, as I suggested 
earlier, whatever knowledge we have of God will come from our and 
God's embodiment in the world. 
Even as we know the reality and intentions of others 
through the processes and actions of their bodies, so the world's 
processes and activities are interpreted as the body of God that 
gives us knowledge of the reality and intentions of God- including 
the intention that there be sentient, conscious, valuing life. 
The universe is regarded as a body supporting life, providing 
order--or a proper mix of regularity and chance, and creating 
beauty. Some of this knowledge will be relatively reflective, 
such as 1) the Big Bang and the evolution of stars, planets, and 
li ; 2) the balance of atmospheric composition, pressure, and 
movement, of temperatures of ocean, land, and air, etc., that 
provide an environment conducive to the preservation of life. 
Some of this knowledge will be relatively pre-reflective, such as 
an intuition of God's purpose in viewing the beauty of a sunset or 
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in the experience of pregnancy and birthing. S This paragraph has 
been meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive as to how we 
might discern God as embodied the world. One's sense of God 
and the world here must be cumulative and integrative or holistic. 
It is an interpretation of the whole of one's embodied existence. 
Clearly the universe contains many particular instances of evil. 
The theist will likely interpret this as an inevitable dimension 
of powerful, yet fragile, processes that assure the good the 
whole. The theist then will have an overall evaluation of the 
world as good and purposeful, though taking into account the many 
negativities of existence. 
8Clearly this model for knowing God has similarities to traditional 
teleological arguments for God's existence. Perhaps the main departure or 
innovation is the intimacy of the perceived connection between God and the 
world's processes with a panentheistic understanding of the world as God's 
body. 
A similarity to traditional cosmological arguments can also be drawn. 
If "body" is split from "mind", that is, if the world is split from divine 
awareness and purpose, then the world is only physical and its existence is 
simply and absolutely contingent. This leaves the existence of an integrated 
world, of something rather than nothing, wholly unexplained. If instead God 
is understood as necessarily existent, the integration of the universe is 
explained as correlative with the integration of divine awareness and 
intentionality. 
Obviously my model of knowing God's intentions through the actions of 
God's body focuses on general processes; it relates to "general" rather than 
"particular" providence. Someone might want to argue that particular events, 
such as the crossing of the Red Sea by the Israelites, are actions of God's 
body through which we discern God's intentions. Perhaps such a model could be 
reconciled to the postmodern spirit by claiming that particular revelations 
are never unambiguous or certain. While allowing that some events or persons 
or texts may be revelatory of God's nature, I nevertheless cannot accept them 
as actions by God. Even if construed as not involving supernatural 
intervention, creaturely indeterminacy and freedom must be kept within very 
narrow bounds, if present at all, to maintain that God is agential in, and 
responsible for, these events beyond God's general activity in and empowerment 
of every event. And then we are left with the question of why God is 
especially responsible for foreplanning and causing these particular, 
admittedly ambiguous events, but not all other particular events. 
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We cannot legitimately doubt that we know persons' intentions 
through their bodily actions. While we may be wrong in our 
reading of particular actions and intentions, practically speaking 
we cannot generally doubt this kind of knowing--and certainly not 
the existence of other embodied persons--unless one creates a 
philosophical problem under the influence of the spirit of 
modernity or is emotionally disturbed. 
Is our knowing through God's embodiment equally certain? 
Alvin Plantinga has labelled beliefs in the existence both of 
other minds and of God as "properly basic" (Plantinga).9 Clearly, 
many in secular society and in nontheistic religions doubt the 
existence of a God who is discernible in and through the world. 
Even as a confirmed theist, I would hardly claim that my knowing 
God's existence is as obvious or indubitable as my knowing the 
existence of other persons. Yet the embodiment of God in the 
world is a plausible metaphor, intuition, and inference. 
If this is so, the question remains as to how much we can 
plausibly claim to know about the God embodied in the world. I 
have thus far suggested that we can discern God as creator and 
9John V. Apczynski has recently made, I think, a convincing case that "proper 
basicality" must be understood as within a particular historical tradition of 
inquiry, in Plantinga's case, the Reformed tradition of Christianity. Yet 
would want to ask about the models of knowing that historically have led to 
belief in God as properly basic in that tradition. One model has involved 
belief in absolute and self-authenticating supernatural revelation. Another 
model, controversial as an interpretation of Calvin and the Reformed 
tradition, posits a direct "awareness of divinity", albeit obscured by sin 
(Plantinga: 65). Of course, both models are suspect for the postmodern 
spirit. Another model involves discerning God's existence and intentions 
through observing the world, which I obviously accept as a viable option, even 
though not so properly basic as our knowledge of other persons. 
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valuer of sentient life. But can this model of the world as God's 
body support knowledge of a God who is conscious, knowing all that 
has transpired to this point, immediately empowering the being of 
the world, and whose existence is necessary--or can it at best 
support a more minimalist conception? If one admits the 
discernibility of any intentionality or purposefulness in the 
world (beyond that possessed by the individual creatures), one is, 
I think, admitting that God is conscious or intentional--or ~ 
~ than conscious or intentional (if one pre this latter 
wording, I have no objection). However, if one balks at the 
discernibility of intentionality, I would submit that the 
existence of conscious, intentional beings in the universe is best 
explained by a conscious, intentional God of whose body these 
other beings are part--while such beings arising from a universe 
that is as a whole nonconscious and nonintentional is incongruous. 
If it is thus granted that a conscious, intentional God has played 
a causative role in this universe's existence, I judge it to be at 
t plausible that this God is both desirous and capable of 
knowing whatever happens in this universe. 
What of the panentheistic intimacy of the world to God-­
including an immediate empowerment of the world? All three 
postmodern responses focus on the universe in framing ultimacy. 
Given this focus and given that our method, our heuristic model, 
for knowing God is postulating the universe as God's body, if we 
find evidence for a conscious, intentional, causative, knowing 
God, a great degree of immanence of the world with respect to God 
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must be firmed. But must there be an absence of externality, 
save for the indeterminate freedom of the creatures? Certainly in 
the human case, there is much about one's body that is outside 
one's awareness, intentionality, and control. However, in sensing 
the world as God's body, there is a sense of the ultimacy or 
holiness of the whole that is the embodied God. It is this sense 
of ultimacy that will not brook externality of God's power and 
knowledge with respect to God's body, the world. Yet we also 
sense that not all is as it ought to be in God's body. In or 
despite the immediacy of divine presence to the universe, God 
permits and empowers a significant amount of chance, spontaneity, 
indeterminate freedom in parts of God's body.l0 Thus while divine 
presence, knowledge, and empowerment are immediate, divine 
intentionality is partly permissive and divine control is far from 
total (and divine knowing does not foresee future creaturely 
decisions to the extent these are indeterminate). 
Finally, the necessary existence of God is implicit in the 
sense of ultimacy and is correlative with panentheistic immediacy. 
Positively, only a God who possesses its own power of existence 
would be capable of immediate presence to all se that exists. 
Negatively, positing the externality of the world with respect to 
God implies a "God above God", to use a Tillichian phrase, who 
includes and empowers both this supposed God and the creatures, 
setting the conditions and structures for the interactions of 
these relatively external beings. 
lOIn itself this is only a partial explanation of the evil in the world. 
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VII. Divine Absence and Presence 
A sense of the absence of God has figured in much modern and 
postmodern (a) theological discussion. I believe that the 
panentheistic formulation I have advanced can account for a 
certain sense of divine absence, while still allowing for the 
reality and presence of God. 
Clearly my model--and many other models--postulate the 
absence of particular, distinguishable actions in which God is 
especially or uniquely agential. Informal surveys in my 
classrooms suggest that most people in the United States at some 
point in their lives have wished for some direct sign from God as 
to God's existence or as to a direction for one's life. The same 
surveys also indicate that most people do not believe they have 
received such a sign. Many have felt the absence of God in the 
sense of particular, distinguishable actions. 
Due to the all-inclusive or all-encompassing nature of God, 
the immediacy of creation to God's awareness and power, on my 
panentheistic conception, no particular event, experience, or 
action in the world can be simply distinguished from God and the 
divine life. Thus, there is a sense in which God is both nothing 
("no-thing") and every thing. God is not uniquely nor 
exhaustively identifiable with any particularities of this world, 
yet God immediately includes and identifies with all the 
particularities of the cosmos. 
On my model, the including whole is immediately aware of the 
included parts. However, the converse does not hold. The 
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creatures, the parts, have no immediate or mystical awareness of 
the divine consciousness, the transcendent aspect of deity, or the 
whole as more than the included universe. We have no immediate 
knowledge of God's immediate awareness and empowerment of us, of 
our unmediated presence to God. Probably this precisely what 
we should expect with a panentheistic model. Because God is not a 
clearly distinct being or cause, because there no resistance to 
our immediate presence to God, there is nothing particular of 
God's inclusion to distinguish (from what we experience of 
ourselves and of the universe); there is nothing particular 
thereof that is external to us or different from us to perceive. 
We are an immediate part of God, but God is not similarly an 
immediate part of us, even in attenuated form. 
As I have suggested, whatever knowledge we have of God is 
mediated, even as is our knowledge of creaturely others (and many 
would hold, even our knowledge of our own bodies, emotions, etc.). 
In the case of other creatures, it is particular aspects of the 
world, particular embodiment(s) that enable knowledge. In the 
case of God, it is the whole universe as embodiment that enables 
knowledge. This involves mediation and interpretation of a 
different order than our knowledge of particular or fragmentary 
entit It is a holistic or integrative interpretation that 
makes a judgment based on what knowledge one has of the whole 
universe. To be sure many particular experiences and elements 
inform such judgment (for example, I earlier mentioned somewhat 
particular processs conducive to life). However, none of these in 
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themselves are taken as immediately, uniquely, or decisively 
revelatory of God. Rather they are part of a contextual 
interpretation of the nature of the universe and of the one who is 
embodied in the universe. If one does not allow the possibility 
of God acting or revealing God's self in exclusive, particular 
ways, then one must make a judgment as to the absence or presence 
of God based upon an overall judgment about the nature of our 
universe. 
In this article I have argued that the nature of the universe 
is epistemologically consistent with the model of the world as the 
body of God, God being conceived in a fairly traditional manner, 
but with significant modifications to reflect a full-fledged 
panentheism. 
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